This article challenges recent analyses on sectarianism and Sunni-Shi'a conflict in Iraq by examining the political and economic factors that have underpinned the rising levels of internecine violence that have become apparent since 2003. Rather than rooted in 'ancient hatreds', these dynamics are, we argue, the outcome of a series of decisions and social transformations imposed on the Iraqi state in the immediate aftermath of the invasion -namely the format of the constitution, counter-insurgency policy, the establishment of a new media sector and the social effects of the Coalition's economic reorganisation.
Introduction
As Eric Davis has noted, 'the problem with much Western analysis of Iraqi politics is the use of conceptual prisms that employ simplistic and flawed conceptions of ethnicity and religion'.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in analyses of the country's violence patterns -particularly the shift in focus away from Coalition forces and towards civilian targets. 3 Here, Davis continues, 'the key task is not to identify the existence of sectarian feelings, but to explain why, at a particular point in time, such feelings are translated into violent behaviour (Davis 2007, p. 3 (emphases in original) ). With this in mind, we focus on the role of the political institutions which emerged following the invasion of 2003. In many cases, these are 'simply viewed as faithful reflections of cultural cleavages or as instruments to manage situations that are considered "givens"', but we argue that the administrative structures and policy decisions established and pursued by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its appointees provided the basis for the communal nature of much of the violence that has emerged since the invasion (Lecours 2000, p. 522 ).
The apparent 'sectarianisation' of society that has taken place is, in other words, not an inevitable outcome of the past, but rather actively produced and institutionalized by the occupying Coalition and its comprador regime. As Max Weiss puts it, 'states, societies, institutions, and communities become sectarian in unique ways, by diverse means, through processes that must be historically contextualized ' (2010, p. 16) . In Iraq, these means have been, we argue, fourfold -the use of supposed confessional identities as a basis for a "representative" constitution, the nascent state's counter-insurgency policies, the politicisation of a new media sector and the uneven impact of economic restructuring. Sectarian violence principally emerged in response to these contingent social changes, not -we shall contend -as a result of the country's pre-existing confessional peculiarities. Most fruitfully seen as an organisational principle, rather than a primordial urge, identity thus, we suggest, has operated in Iraq 'more as ordering device than as an impelling force' (Mueller 2000, p. 62) .
Culturalism and Violence
The ferocious, and apparently wanton, character of civil wars has long led some to conclude that many are most profitably explained by ancient and insurmountable cultural differences. The human tendency to form exclusive, potent networks of attachment -or lack of therein -was, for
Tönnies, Cooley and other pioneers of sociology, the key distinction between rationalist and individualist modernity and the 'primary group' structure of the Gemeinschaft. Believed by sociobiologists to be 'controlled primarily by the values, norms, or duties imposed by the sociocultural structure… distantly related to the basic propensities of individuals on which natural selection operated' (Hinde 1993, p. 49) , this emphasis on the primordial roots of shared identity has been used, in its broadest form, to account for the social structures of developing countries, as well as anti-modern digressions within Western states (see Shils on Nazism, for instance (1957) ). These are deemed especially potent where they overlap with religious affiliation and the 'powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations' it generates (Geertz 1973, p. 90) . During the 1990s, amid a spate of particularly vicious civil wars, 'ancient hatreds' were again used to account for the apparently divisive role of faith and ethnicity in non-Western politics (Mueller 2000) . The result, Steven David, concludes, is that, while 'West European countries have assimilated the social ideas and attitudes of peace', elsewhere others continue to maintain 'ideologically driven religious, ethnic, and political hatreds ' (1992, p. 138) .
While the grand canvass of Huntington's incompatible civilisations may have offered the broadest application of such thinking, the most widely cited case study has been the war in
Yugoslavia. Here, a combination of ethnic and religious difference was adjudged so immutably volatile by writers such as Kaplan (1993a) and Ajami (1993) as to convince President Clinton that, firstly, intervention would be futile and, secondly, that any long-term future would inevitably involve territorial fragmentation (Kaufman, 1999) . Convinced by observations, such as the former's claim that 'the Balkans are truly foreign… a cauldron of history… created by the collapse of the multinational Hapsburg and Ottoman empires', policy makers largely ignored local analysts' repeated emphasis of contemporary political dynamics not so very different from social problems further west (Kaplan 1993b) . As Patrick Finney puts it, 'numerous external commentators accepted the claims of nationalist demagogues at face value and consequently represented these wars as historically determined, almost natural phenomena in a region inhabited by exotic primitives in thrall to primordial hatreds and a cyclical history of vicious blood-letting ' (2010, p. 343) .
Today, much of what has been written and said about the conflagration in Iraq is little different.
There, and in neighbouring Syria, it is said, in a discourse strikingly similar to commentaries on the role of Tito in Yugoslavia, that the Hussein and Assad families kept a lid on the ancient hatreds that have always existed between Shi'a and Sunnis through Ba'athism's repressive patrimonialism. 4 As soon as people had the opportunity -via a combination of rebellion and external intervention -to express their identities more freely, then, the narrative goes, a return to confessional chauvinism becomes all but inevitable. As Tony Blair put it, 'once the regime changes, then out come pouring all the tensions -tribal, ethnic and of course above all religious;
...the sectarian divisions become even more acute and the result is the mess we see all over the region' (2014). The bloodshed which followed the 'liberation' of Iraq was thus not a political response (or even an attempt to retake the refineries), but part of a broader, age-old war between two primordial and immutably incompatible blocs who incomprehensibly and permanently fell out long before the West discovered that God had put its oil under their sand (to paraphrase a popular bumper-sticker).
Resistance to the occupation was, for Washington insiders such as Soner Çağaptay, a result of a 'problem within Islam' -specifically Sunni Arabs' sectarian inability to accept a democratic, Shi'amajority government (2004) . Inadvertently 'embroiled in a 1400 year old dispute', the West's failure 'to admit the fact that Islam is essentially two religions' organised around unremitting hatred is, for many, the key reason for the gradual fragmentation of Iraqi society (Lawrence 2015) . The reasons for this must apparently 'be traced back', defence analysts at the House of which, in an echo of 1990s thinking on the Balkans, render the country 'fundamentally fractious (and perhaps fundamentally not viable)' (Smith, Brook-Holland and Page 2014 (David 2007, p. 28) . As a former senior CPA adviser put it, 'Middle Easterners culturally are unable to bring themselves to "let bygones be bygones"'. Sectarian violence will thus continue in perpetuity -or, he continues, 'until Allah decides which side is the most worthy' (Rhode 2012 (Nasr 2006, p. 23) .
This kind of analysis shares, as Eller and Coughlan note, three fundamental assumptions (1993 p. 187 ). The first is that the identities to which Murray and others refer are a priori. Attachments are 'natural' givens, underived from social experience. The second is that they are ineffable. Those identified as a part of a group are bound together 'at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributable to the very tie itself' (Geertz 1973, p. 259) . The third is that they are affective. The feelings that are said to underpin such 'primordial' attachments are, as manifestations of the supra-family, arbitrarily assumed to outweigh other forms of identitysuch as gender, class, party and so on. Culture, race, ethnicity, religion and so on are, as the principal manifestations of this (apparently innate) drive to coalesce, thus not created by social interaction, but prefigure it. A sectarian attachment is a result of immutable forces operating outside individual control. Little more can be said about its genesis or the 'more mundane practices that might act to produce or reproduce it' (Eller and Coughlan 1993, pp. 193-4 Iraqis themselves' and of legitimising a timetable for Western withdrawal (Visser 2007-8, p. 95) .
Portraying the Coalition as caught between two primordial and incommensurate blocs thereby distanced the impact of its policies from the source of the violence ('liberat[ing] ourselves from the notion that "we" have caused' the resultant fratricidal bloodshed, as Tony Blair put it (2014)).
After all, by focusing on apparently religiously-inspired sectarian hatreds and 'denying the rational political demands of insurgent groups', it also helped to justify 'a restricted set of coercive and punitive counter-terrorism strategies, whilst simultaneously making non-violent alternatives such as dialogue, compromise and reform appear inconceivable and nonsensical' (Jackson 2007, p.
421).

Counter-Insurgency and the Muhasasa
Working from this assumption, the Coalition initially took the view that Sunni Arab opposition was limited 'to those fanatical enough or stupid enough not to realise that the old regime is dead' (Dodge 2004, p. 77) . With the leadership of the two largest paramilitary forces -the SCIRI's Badr
Corps and the Kurdish peshmerga -firmly entrenched within the IGC and the Ba'ath's security apparatus dissolved (discussed in more detail below), occupation forces were generally content to make 'tactical arrangements with militias on an ad hoc basis' (Rathmell el al. 2005, p. 66 With Shi'a militia already deployed to the Sunni Arab majority provinces in considerable numbers, the bombing of the al-Askari mosque in February 2006 led to an explosion of sectarian violence. 12 In retaliation, the Badr-dominated police force, along with irregulars from the Mahdi army, launched a number of attacks targeting Sunni Arab insurgents as well as civilians (Damluji 2010, pp. 75-80) . In the absence of any reliable data on the actual demographic numbers that form a basis for the quotas, the idea that the muhasasa system, and even sectarianism more broadly, has been 'something that the ruling political parties created in order to maintain their privileges and power and then reinforced by deploying their affiliated armed groups' became particularly pronounced amongst the most (predominantly Sunni Arab) disenfranchised (Boduszyński 2016, p. 115) . As insurgent activity rose to over 1000 attacks per week during early-2007, many parts of the country became ungovernable. In response, around 100,000 so-called sahwa (awakening) Sunni Arab irregulars were recruited by US military commanders to restore public order in western governorates such as Anbar, Diyala and Saladin. By the end of that year, the Coalition had added these paramilitary forces to its bio-metric, photographic payroll (worth $150 million in 2008 alone) and had started to recast them as "concerned local citizens" (Long 2008, p. 77) . While this succeeded in reducing violence (helping to structure over 800 negotiated ceasefires), it embedded still deeper the CPA's counter-insurgency policy in the extra-legal authority of neighbourhood strongmen, thereby weakening the central government. In other words, 'by forging local alliances with a motley collection of former Sunni Arab insurgents', the Coalition further embraced a 'divide and rule strategy' which was always likely to 'prevent the development of a genuinely unified Iraqi state' (MacDonald 2014, p. 214).
Media Fragmentation
The structure of Iraq's media sector has its roots in the Pentagon' 
16). Announced in June 2003 as a replacement for the Ministry of
Information (dissolved a month earlier with the loss of more than 5,000 jobs), it rapidly came to be seen as a mouthpiece of the occupation, being regularly given 'a laundry list of CPA activities to cover' (prompting a string of resignations amongst senior executives) (Markakis 2016, p. 121) .
Amid a series of media closures under Order Number 14 which prohibited not only inciting violence, but also publishing material that is 'patently false and calculated to promote opposition to the CPA', only 24 per cent of local respondents regarded the IMN as "objective" (Hubbard 2007, p. 63; Rohde 2005-6, p. 12) . As Iraqis took a greater role in the IMN during the transitional period, its outlets came to be increasingly seen as 'reflecting the views and goals of the Shia political parties' (Ridolfo 2012, p. 254-5) . Since 'the CPA never drew a line separating the IMN's institutional administration from that of the state', its al-Iraqiya television channel, for instance, came under the leadership of Habib al-Sadr (a relative of the ISCI's Abdul Aziz al-Hakim) and
Muhammad Jassim Khudayer, a senior Dawa Party official (al-Rawi 2012, p. 91). As a result, its programming started to place particular emphasis on the suffering of Shi'as under Saddam, the "martyrdom" of deceased Shi'a militia and the success of the government's counter-terrorism strategy -frequently consisting of Sunni Arab captives being forced to confess to their role in the insurgency (often following torture) (al-Rawi 2012, pp. 75-76) .
Since the Coalition remained principally concerned with the military imperative of winning hearts and minds and lessening the immediate threat to its forces, it did little to deal with the media's growing sectarianism. Instead, it focused on placing favourable articles in the press through Iraqi journalists hired by defence contractors such as the Lincoln Group (which pursued a strategy entitled "Divide and Prosper") (Mazzetti and Daragahi 2005) . It also worked with civil society organisations it saw as sympathetic. The Free Iraq Foundation (part of the Iraq-America
Freedom Alliance -a network created to give a voice 'to Iraqis who are grateful for their newfound freedom'), for instance, was heavily funded to produce television and radio programmes supporting democratic rule (Barker 2008, p. 119; Markakis 2016, p. 134) 
248-9).
Economic Deconstruction
The initial plan of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, the short-lived predecessor of the CPA, was to retain as much of Iraq's governmental infra-structure as possible.
Only 'those who were part of the thug mechanism under Saddam' would be removed, its director, Jay Garner told Time magazine (Bennett 2003) . Not wishing to 'throw the baby out with the Baath water', as his advisor Tim Carney put it, the post-war strategy was based 'on bringing the Iraqi army back and using them in reconstruction' (Garner and Carney quoted in Roberts (Allawi 2007, p. 123; Yousif 2010, p. 363; Yousif 2007, p. 48 Although attempts were made to reverse the policy, Bremer claims that they were stymied 'by the dominant Shia and Kurdish political factions in Baghdad' (Bremer, Dobbins and Gompert 2008, p. 32) . 18 It is certainly the case that both the Coalition and Allawi's interim administration were unable to prevent Ahmed Chalabi using his chairmanship of the HNDC to focus the 'greater bulk of his efforts towards establishing Shia dominance in the evolving political system'. controls' and in violation of international law, DFI monies arrived in $1.6 million "cashpaks" to fund reconstruction projects, of which three-quarters were commissioned through noncompetitive tenders (Whyte 2007, pp. 184, 187) . When an auditor (KPMG Bahrain) was eventually appointed in 2004, it was found that $8.7 billion of the $9.19 billion the US Defense Department received from the DFI 'was not properly accounted for ' (al-Ali 2014, p. 195 ). (Sassoon 2016, p. 26) . Since these came to be increasingly under the control of successive administrations dominated by Shi'a elites, it has been the Sunni Arabs that have been most acutely affected (an estimated 10 per cent of whom -ten times the proportion of Germans affected by de-Nazification measures at the end of the Second World War -have been subject to the HNDC's lustrations) (Gaub 2017) . This, combined with the fact that almost half the civilian deaths occurring outside Baghdad have taken place within the governorates of Anbar, Nineveh, Salah-a-Din, has produced a collapse public services and thus, as Table One Tertius gaudens, this offered the Coalition some benefits -'as long as Iraqi leaders were fighting over sub-national interests, the overall direction of the country could be shaped from outside' (Muttitt 2012, p. 158 the 'sectarianism that currently exists is the result of Iraq's political economy, rather than "ancient hatreds"' and it is this struggle for social power, within the parameters set by the Coalition, which turned 'Iraqis into sectarian extremists of a kind completely alien to the country's long history of sectarian coexistence' (Visser 2007-8, p. 93 mid-2007 (O'Hanlon and Campbell 2008, p. 4) . 4 A recent commentary captures the popular understanding of this narrative quite well: 'Iraq was a country ruled by a Sunni, Saddam Hussein, in which a majority of the people were Shiites. Potential conflict there? You bet. Saddam, however, kept the lid on this seething cauldron. Getting rid of him took the lid off' (Lawrence 2015) . 5 According to retired admiral and current dean of Tufts' Fletcher School, James Stavridis, Syria should also be presented with its own Dayton Accords, dividing the country into an 'Alawite rump state, ...a Kurdish enclave' and a Sunni centre (2015) . 6 The governorates to which power is devolved are not drawn along such sectarian lines and therefore could not be 'combine [d] into regional governments' as Biden and Gelb claim (Visser 2007: 91) . 7 It is important to note that this was the first time in Iraq that a governing body was formed along explicitly ethnosectarian lines. Under Saddam Hussein's rule, although the Shi'a and other groups suffered discrimination on several levels, open talk about sectarian identities was a taboo. In fact, the Ba'ath regime emphasised the Arab identity of the state and its population, in contrast to the external Iranian (and, intermittently, the internal Kurdish) enemy. As such, Iraqis were not allowed to speak in sectarian terms, and the terms "Sunni" and "Shi'a"' were rarely heard in public (Haddad 2014, p. 155) . 8 With almost 80 per cent voting in favour, the CPA claimed that the referendum represented a clear endorsement of the constitutional process. In reality, though, it only narrowly passed -if in Nineveh (where just 57 per cent of the electorate turned out) there had been a 10 point increase in the rejection rate, there would have been the three-governorate super-majority (written into the TAL to give the KRG a veto) necessary to vote it down. 9 The monthly casualty rate for US troops, for instance, declined from around 70 fatalities between March 2003 and August 2007 to less than 30 for the following 18 months (O' Hanlon and Campbell 2008, p. 17) . 10 Other than the two Kurdish Parties, the renamed Badr Organisation, Chalabi's Iraqi National Accord, Allawi's Iraqi National Congress and the armed wing of the Dawa Party, those militia covered by the memoranda included Kata'ib Hezbollah (believed to be led by one of Ibrahim alJa'afari's security advisors) which is now on the State's Department's list of foreign terrorist organisations. The other two were the Communist and Islamic Parties, represented on the IGC by Hamid Majid Mousa and Mohsen Abul Hamid respectively. 11 These allegations were put to the Minister in an interview with the US network, Public Broadcasting Service, in November 2006 (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gangsofiraq/interviews/jabr.html). Casteel's claims were corroborated by Matt Sherman, a legal adviser to the Ministry of Interior, who confirmed 20 Executive Order 13303 stated that 'any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process is prohibited' with respect to the DFI and the Iraqi petroleum industry (full text available from: https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Documents/13303.pdf). Section Four (Paragraph Three) of Order Number 17 specified that 'contractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal process with respect to acts performed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a Contract or any subcontract thereto (full text available from: ww.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/COALITION_PROVISIONAL.pdf) [accessed 4 .
